Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Travis B. Davis v. Elizabeth Anne Davis, Sandy
Thornock and George T. Thornock : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda Quinton-Burr; Attorney for Appellant.
Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorney for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Davis v. Davis, No. 20000433 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2781

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVIS B. DAVIS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Case No. 20000433-CA
vs.
ELIZABETH ANNE DAVIS,
Oral Argument Priority 4
Respondent and Appellee.
SANDY THORNOCK and GEORGE T.
THORNOCK,
Interveners and Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE GARY P. STOTT, JUDGE

LESLIE SLAUGH
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84603

LINDA QUTNTON-BURR, Bar No. 5732
42 North University Avenue, Suite 207
Provo, Utah 84601

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

FILED
APR 0 * 2001
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVIS B. DAVIS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Case No. 20000433-CA

vs.
ELIZABETH ANNE DAVIS,
Oral Argument Priority 4
Respondent and Appellee.
SANDY THORNOCK and GEORGE T.
THORNOCK,
Intervenors and Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE GARY P. STOTT, JUDGE

LESLIE SLAUGH
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
Provo,Utah 84603

LINDA QUINTON-BURR, Bar No. 5732
42 North University Avenue, Suite 207
Provo, Utah 84601

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

ii

Issues Presented

1

Summary of Reply Brief

2

Argument

4

1.

2.

Grandparents did not appeal the trial court's finding (#4) that "the
parental presumption is in place in this instance,"and should be
barred from raising this new claim for the first time in response to
Appellant's Brief. But, were this claim properly before the Court, it
would fail because Father (Appellant), in agreeing that Kory should
be in the care of Grandparents while Father was overseas, neither
"lost custody" nor relinquished his parental rights, so the lower
court was correct in finding that the parental presumption, in which
part of a parent's due process rights inhere, was in place

4

The record clearly demonstrates that Father's constitutional right to
the custody and control of his child, i.e., the parental presumption,
was in place, was not rebutted by sufficient evidence, but was
subordinated to a comparative "best interests of the child" analysis,
contrary to federal and state law thus violating Father's
constitutional rights as elucidated in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct.
2054(2000)(See Appellant's Brief, C-E, at pp. 2-3; 13-31)

7

Conclusion

12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited;
Bake v. Bake. 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
Duncan v. Howard. 918 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

11
6, 7, 9, 12, 13

State ex rel. H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

9

Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982)

4, 8, 9, 10

In re J.P.. 648 P. 2d 1364 (Utah 1982)

11

L.A.W. v. State (State ex rel M.W.I 970 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
afFd in part and rev'd in part. 12 P.3d 80 (Utah 2000)
Troxel v. Granville. 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000)

5, 11
2, 8, 9, 10, 12

Statutes and Rules Cited
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C. §501 et. seq. 1940 as Amended
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-903

ii

6
5, 10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVIS B. DAVIS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Case No. 20000433-CA
vs.
ELIZABETH ANNE DAVIS,
Oral Argument Priority 4
Respondent and Appellee.
SANDY THORNOCK and GEORGE T.
THORNOCK,
Intervenors and Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

Grandparents (Intervenors/Appellees) did not appeal the trial court's finding
(#4) that "the parental presumption is in place in this instance,"and should be
barred from raising this new claim for the first time in response to Appellant's
Brief. But, were this claim properly before the Court, it would fail because
Father (Appellant), in agreeing that Kory should be in the care of Grandparents
while Father was overseas and during a period of time when Father was unable
to care for Kory properly, neither "lost custody" nor relinquished his parental
1

rights, so the lower court was correct infindingthat the parental presumption,
in which part of a parent's due process rights inhere, was in place.
2.

The record clearly demonstrates that Father's constitutional right to the custody
and control of his child, i.e., the parental presumption, was in place, was not
rebutted by sufficient evidence, but was subordinated to a comparative "best
interests of the child" analysis, contrary to federal and state law thus violating
Father's constitutional rights as elucidated in Troxel v. Granville. 120 S.Ct.
2054(2000) were violated (See Appellant's Brief, C-E, at pp. 2-3; 13-31).
SUMMARY OF REPLY BRIEF

The trial court properly found that "as demonstrated in the record and pleadings, a
change of circumstances has been presented to allow modification of the prior [custody] order."
Findings of Fact #2; R. at 368, p. 68, lines 17-22. Father sought modification of the prior order
not only because the custody arrangement was always intended to be temporary (R. at 54, 66,
67), but also because Grandparents made no changes in their attitude towards Father and
continued to attempt to interfere his right to a parental relationship with Kory and with his
visitation with Kory. R. at 37; Evaluation at 12, 14-15. Through court action, Father has finally
been able to exercise consistent visitation and re-establish the bonds with his child that were
broken when the state of California contacted Grandparents and allowed them to take possession
of Kory when Father was stationed abroad. The record clearly demonstrates that Appellant has a
stable family life (R. At 368, pp. 26-27), and his availability to be a parent has improved since his
divorce and discharge from the military. It is also clear that Father's wife enjoys caring for Kory
and his step-sisters (R. At 368, p 31); that Father and his wife have made and continue to make
2

financial sacrifices for Kory (R. At 368, pp. 27, 34-35), and Father has a stable family life and
secure relationships, (R. At 368, p. 39), and, while he may not be as mature as the grandparents
he was being compared with, his maturity level is consonant with his age (R. At 368, p. 26, lines
20-25; p, 39, lines 19-23).
The trial court properly found that the parental presumption was in place. Though they
had the burden of proof in rebutting the parental presumption, Grandparents presented no
evidence at trial. The Custody Evaluator acknowledged that his evaluation completed in
December of 1998 was a best interests comparative custodian evaluation (R. At 368, p. 9, lines
21-24; p. 49),1 based on no standardized tests (R. At 368, p. 12), but which relied heavily on
hearsay.2 Months later, without any additional contact with the parties or with Kory, Evaluator
submitted a "minimal addendum" (R. 368, at p. 49) which recast the already-completed evaluation
in terms of Hutchison factors admittedly unfamiliar to the Evaluator (R. 368, at p. 49)3.
Despite Father's objections to the weight given hearsay in the Evaluation (R. At 368, p.
65, lines 15-21), the court considered the Evaluator's testimony "constructive" (R. At 368, pp.
1

In the introduction to his Evaluation (p. 1), Evaluator states that the "the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the father and the grandparents have been evaluated with respect to
their parenting style, their approach to discipline, their personal values, as well as moral and
ethical considerations." Clearly, Evaluator saw his task as a comparative custodian best interests
analysis.
2

Evaluator made no effort to corroborate the first six pages of "information" in the
15-page Evaluation (R. at 368, pp. 16-19; pp.40-41, 52-53); Evaluator not sure he could consider
portions of what he reported in the Evaluation as "facts"; Evaluator did not follow up on contacts
Father gave him to verify Father's claims because "that was after my report had been submitted. I
was comfortable with the information I had at the time, so, no, I did not do any follow-up on
[difficulty of getting hardship discharge]," pp. 40-41).
3

Evaluator introduced his Addendum with the incorrect observation that the
Hutchison factors "give rise to the issue of parental presumption."
3

64-65), and made it clear that any evidence offered to rebut the hearsay would be of no avail,
because the court had already decided the issue of custody based on the Evaluator's "reports" and
the Court's interview with Kory (R. At 368, p. 65, lines 3-10).
Both the Evaluator and the Court rendered the parental presumption "illusory" (See
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) by treating the comparative custodian best
interests analysis as evidence rebutting the parental presumption. This was plain error, and is
appealable whether preserved in the lower court or raised for the first time on appeal.(See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2, and citations therein. ) This court should award custody of Kory to his
Father, who, with his wife and their children, are eager to integrate Kory fiilly into their family life
in a way that will reduce any anxiety Kory may feel about a change of residence (R. At 368, p. 26,
lines 2-6).
Argument
1.

Grandparents (Intervenors/Appellees) did not appeal the trial court's finding (#4)
that "the parental presumption is in place in this instance,"and should be barred
from raising this new claim for the first time in response to Appellant's Brief.
But, were this claim properly before the Court, it would fail because Father
(Appellant), in agreeing that Kory should be in the care of Grandparents while
Father was overseas and until he was able to reestablish himself in Utah and
reestablish his parental relationship with Kory, neither "lost custody" nor
relinquished his parental rights, so the lower court was correct in finding that the
parental presumption, in which part of a parent's due process rights inhere, was
in place.

4

Prior to responding to Appellant's brieffiledwith this Court, Grandparents never denied
that the parental presumption was in place in this case and must be rebutted. If they wanted to
contest that point, they should have appealed the finding of the trial court. They should not be
allowed to appeal this issue at this late juncture.
The parties stipulated to a custody evaluation, which was submitted December 28,
1998. When it came back, Grandparents' Counsel, obviously aware that the parental presumption
was in place and must be rebutted before Rule 4-903 comparative analysis is applied, gave the
custody evaluator a list of the Hutchison factors, and a copy of State ex rel M.W.. 970P.2d 284
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) afFd in part and rev'd in part 12 P. 3d 80 (Utah 2000). R. at 368, p. 4951), and asked the evaluator to address those factors. R. at 368, p. 49. If the parental presumption
did not apply, there would have been no reason for their attorney to request that the evaluator
consider the Hutchison factors. In effect, Grandparents' Brief is an appeal of the trial court's
finding that the parental presumption was in place, and that appeal should be rejected by this
Court.
However, if that claim were properly before the court, it should be rejected, because
Father never "lost custody,"as claimed by Grandparents. Father was Kory's primary caretaker; he
sought unsuccessfully to avoid deployment overseas. R. at 256. While Father was deployed
overseas, Mother neglected child, and Grandparents took custody of Child rather than have
custody go to the state of California. Father was not even notified about the neglect and the
child's removal to Utah until months after Grandparents obtained the child. Because he was still
subject to deployment by the U.S. Navy, he agreed to allow Grandparents to continue to care for
Kory temporarily.
5

From the time Grandparents were awarded temporary custody of Kory in September
1994, until his honorable discharge from the Navy, Father made repeated, but unsuccessful
application for a hardship discharge in order to care for Kory. R. at 368, p.29, lines 8-20, lines 18; Evaluation at 11. Because Father did not at that time have physical custody of Kory, he was
battling a Catch-22 situation: without physical custody of Kory the Navy wouldn't grant the
hardship discharge; because the Navy was deploying him overseas, he couldn't be considered by a
court as a good candidate for physical custody. When he was in the United States, Father
traveled to Utah as often as possible to see Kory (Evaluation at 4, 9, 10), but Grandparents'
efforts to obstruct the relationship resulted in Father seldom being able to visit Kory more than
once during a week-long leave, and Grandparents refused to allow Father to take Kory overnight.
R. at 368, p. 41, lines 12-24; Evaluation at 4, 9, 10. Grandparents flippantly dismiss Father's
plight with the assertion that "it is evident that Father voluntarily relinquished custody of Kory
when having custody did not fit with Father's choice of military lifestyle." (Apppellees' Brief at
20). The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act 50 App. U.S.C. Section 501 has attempted to
remedy the very real constraints which military personnel face in legal proceedings to which they
are parties when on active duty, but not all of those problems are addressed merely by staying the
proceedings.
Father's parental fitness was never adjudicated, nor did he relinquish his parental rights
at any time. What he did do was attempt to make the best of what became an increasingly
difficult custody arrangement during a period of time in which he could control neither the U. S
Government's determination of where he should live nor Grandparents' willingness to allow
visitation when he was on leave. He, like the father in Duncan v. Howard. 918 P.2d. 888, 893
6

(Utah Ct. App. 1996), sought as much contact with Kory as his deployer and Kory's
Grandparents would allow. As was the case with the father in Duncan, "[g]iven the opportunity
to bond more fully with his father he would most likely develop a closer bond and a more normal
father/son relationship. Evaluation, at 7. This case presents an issue of first impression in the
interpretation of the Hutchison factors: can parental absence which is beyond the parent's control
be used as evidence to rebut the parental presumption? Needless to say, this presents a significant
policy issue for parents in the military, and for parents who through no fault of their own may
have little access to their children, and so are limited in the amount of "bonding time" available to
them.
By their repeated use of the phrase "lost custody," Grandparents imply that the custody
arrangement was something akin to foster care or adoption by Grandparents. The divorce
proceedings included no investigation of parental fitness, and Father stipulated to continuing the
custody arrangement in order to obtain court-ordered visitation to enable him to renew the close
relationship he had with Kory before Grandparents' actions threatened to sever their bond
altogether. Father's stipulation to what was in Kory's best interest at that time did not extinguish
his parental rights or his entitlement to the parental presumption and did permit him to bring suit
in the trial court to seek custody of Kory when enumerated factors constituting a change in
circumstances warranted a change of custody.
2.

The record clearly demonstrates that Father's constitutional right to the custody
and control of his child, i.e., the parental presumption, was in place, was not
rebutted by sufficient evidence, but was subordinated to a comparative "best
interests of the child" analysis, contrary to federal and state law and thus violating
7

Father's constitutional rights as elucidated in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct.
2054(2000)(See Appellant's Brief, C-E, at pp. 2-3; 13-31).
The Utah Supreme Court was crystal clear in Hutchison that the parental presumption
"cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the opposing party possesses superior
qualifications, has established a deeper bond with the child, or is able to provide more desirable
circumstances." Hutchison, at 41. Yet, comparative custodian analysis was the only evidence
advanced by Grandparents and that evidence was third or fourth hearsay via the Custody
Evaluator as the Grandparents, who had the burden of proof, presented no evidence at trial.
The Custody Evaluator's Addendum was not based on any further contact with the
parties or with Kory (R. At 368, p. 35 lines 17-p. 36, linel), as the Evaluator simply repackaged
his hearsay information and recommendations under Hutchison factor headings, and submitted
them to the court March 17, 1999.4 Clearly the Evaluatory/rs/ performed a comparative analysis
of the best interests of the child, and then explicitly used that analysis to conclude that "Travis
does not appear to have demonstrated the 'Hutchison factors' with regard to Kory over the
duration of his son's childhood." Addendum, concluding paragraph. That statement shows that
the Evaluator misunderstood who had the burden of proof in this case, and did not understand
that a comparative custodian best interests analysis is not legally sufficient to rebut the parental
presumption.
The Evaluator improperly first focused on a best interests analysis and the "factors
considered by Utah courts in making custody decisions when the parental presumption is not an
4

The Addendum is misdated "1998," but Evaluator's testimony (R. At 368, p. 49)
clarifies that the Addendum was submitted several months after the Evaluation submitted
December 28, 1998, so had to be in 1999.
8

issue." Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d. 888, 893 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)(R. 368, p. 9). When
gathering his information months before considering the parental presumption, the Evaluator, like
the experts in Duncan, concentrated on the potential "difficult adjustment" for Kory that a
custody change might require (although the Evaluator assumed that a change of custody could
only happen "summarily," rather than gradually, as Father had anticipated). That focus on best
interests before the parental presumption has been rebutted is plain error.
The trial court found that the parental presumption was in place, but appears to have
viewed it as merely one aspect of a best interests analysis. (R. At 69,1. 20 ff; R. at 73,1. 5-11). It
appears that the determinative factor for the trial court, as with the Evaluator, was the potential
stress that Kory might experience if custody were changed. Yet "the trial court and [the appellate]
court cannot consider anything beyond the three characteristics giving rise to the parental
presumption until that presumption has been rebutted or otherwise lost." Duncan, 893.
In their reply brief Grandparents assert, contrary to the Utah Supreme Court, and the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Troxel, that "The sole purpose of the parental presumption is to
serve the best interests of the child." Grandparents are wrong on this point. "The parental
presumption was judicially created to protect both the rights of natural parents and the best
interests of children." State ex rel. H.R.V., 906 P. 2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), citing
Hutchison . 40 ("This presumption recognizes 'the natural right and authority of the parent to the
child's custody.'" (quoting State ex rel.Jennings. 20 Utah 2d 50, 52, 432 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah
1987)).
Subordinating parental presumption to comparative analysis erases parental rights

9

altogether. 5 The Utah Supreme Court's stated that "If the [parental] presumption could be
rebutted merely by evidence that a nonparent would be a superior custodian, "the parent's natural

where possible, by his or her natural parent." Hutchison, at 41.
Clearly the Court also mistook Evaluator's repackaged Rule 4 903 comparative
analysis for legally sufficient evidence rebutting the Hutchison factors, despite Evaluator's
obviously muddled understanding of Hutchison and the burden of proof it places on the

nonlawyers ( R . at pp. 71-72), the Court itself categorizes the Hutchison factors as "factors to be
considered in determining the best interests and welfare of Cory[sic]." R at 368, p. 74, lines 1113. The Court explicitly characterizes the Hutchison factors as "factors in this case as to what's
in his [Kory's] best interests." R. at 368, p. 79,11. 13-15. In addition, even if the Court had been
proper!} considei

pai ath <re analysis, the Court's statement that the i easons foi which

Father did not have custody of Kory were not relevant to the court's decision about custody (R.
At 368, p. 65, lines 3-8; p. 66, lines 8-10) is also plain error, and contrary to the directive of
UCJA 4-903(3)(E)(v) which specifically lists any reasons a parent may have relinquished custody
in the past as being relevant to the determination of custody.
Characterizii ig t! le pai ei ital pi esumption as oi ily oi ic factoi It i a bests interests of the
child analysis is contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of parental presumption in Troxel
(see discussion in Appellant's brief, pp. 31-34) and contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's analysis

See Evaluator's conclusions-all stated in comparative custodian best interests
terms- at Evaluation 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13.
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of parental presumption in Hutchison, where the Court directed that the best interests analysis
occur only after the parental presumption has been rebutted. The Utah Supreme Court, in
L.A.W. v. State of Utah, 378 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 34 (2000), cautioned that
the [parental] presumption in a custody case serves to protect a parent's rights
in his or her children in the same way that requiring proof of unfitness in a
termination of parental rights case does. Without the presumption, a parent
would be required to engage in custody battles with nonparents based solely
on the children's best interests. A parent's constitutional and natural right in
his or her children are too important to allow such a result. Cf. In re J.P., 648
P.2d at 1376 (noting "the standard of'best interest' of the child [alone]
provides an open invitation to trample on individual rights through trendy
redefinitions and administrative or judicial abuse).
Because both the Evaluator and the court used the comparative custodian analysis as evidence to
rebut the parental presumption, Father's right to custody was challenged solely on the child's best
interest, an outcome the justices decried, warning that the circumstances in which a parent may
lose the parental presumption must "be narrowly defined to ensure that a parent's rights remain
protected." IdL The Court further explained that the parental presumption cannot be lost
"without a court ever ruling on whether the parent's parenting skills are deficient," for "such a
result would routinely expose a parent to the loss of custody of his or her children based solely on
the children's best int interests, a standard recognized to be vulnerable to abuse. See In re J.P.,
648 P. 2d at 1376. Certainly, this result is unacceptable in light of the parent's constitutional and
natural rights to custody of his or her children. LA. W., at 35.
Further, the lower court appears to have given determinative weight either to the young
child's preference (R. at 368, p. 81, lines 17-22), characterized by this Court in Bake v. Bake, 772
P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) as "an exceptional criterion upon which to base the custody

11

determination/'6 or upon concern about the child's adjustment period if custody were changed—an
impermissible consideration while the parental presumption is in place (See Duncan, at 893), and
certain!} a factoi that can, be addressed ii i a rei inification plai i
Conclusion
Grandparents Reply Brief, with the exception of occasional sentences scattered therein,
does not respond to Appellant's arguments A-F. Those issues offirstimpression in defining and
consistently applying the Hutchison factors (i.e., the definition of the "particular point in time";

be rebutted by parental absence which was beyond the control of the parent; and whether in this
case, the lower court's application of the Hutchison analysis violated the constitutional rights
elucidated in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)(See Appellant's Brief at C-E, pp. 2-3,
13-31). These issues have not and cannot be answered by Appellees, because the floating

this case.
Grandparents choose to argue a point they should have argued in the trial court, or
argued in appealing thefindings,but only now for thefirsttime introduce. In addition, they
provide no justification for the plain error which occurred in allowing a comparative custodian
analysis !o be used as "evidence" intended to rebut the pai ei ital pi esi imptiol i
This court, shouldfind,as it did in Duncan, that though Father "never has had custody
of [Kory]," "he litis «r\ti lost \m nyM musseil the presumption due to an adjudication of any

6

In Bake, the two children were 9 and 11 years old, respectively; Kory was 7 when
his preference was apparently given determinative weight.
12

lack of fitness as a parent." At 892. Like the father in Duncan, Father "has visited [Kory] when
able, and [has] been involved in extensive litigation seeking visitation rights and then custody of
[Kory]. At 894. Therefore, he still benefits from the parental presumption unless the
[Grandparents] successfully rebut it." Duncan, at 892 (reaffirmed in State ex rel M. W. 970P.2d
284 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) afFd in part and rev'd in part 12 P. 3d 80 2000 UT 79, 12 P.3d 80,
85). Grandparents did not rebut the parental presumption, but advanced a comparative custodian
analysis at the trial court level and now at the appellate level. Failure of the lower court to require
that rebuttal of the parental presumption prior to the consideration of comparative custodian
analysis is a violation of the parent's due process rights, and is plain error which the Court may
correct. (See Appellant's Brief pages 1-2 and citations therein)
This Court followed that analysis in Duncan, and should follow that analysis in this case,
and return Kory to the custody of his Father as it did in Duncan.
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing arguments, the appellate court should reverse
the decision of the trial court, and award custody of Kory to his Father, Travis Davis.

Dated this 2nd day of April ,2001.
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